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Background: The acronym LASA (look-alike sound-alike) denotes the problem of confusing similar- looking and/or
sounding drugs accidentally. The most common causes of medication error jeopardizing patient safety are LASA as
well as high workload.
Case presentation: A critical incident report of medication errors of opioids for postoperative analgesia by look-
alike packaging highlights the LASA aspects in everyday scenarios. A change to a generic brand of medication
saved costs of up to 16% per annum. Consequently, confusion of medication incidents occurred due to the similar
appearance of the newly introduced generic opioid. Due to consecutive underdosing no life-threatening situation
arose out of this LASA based medication error.
Conclusions: Current recommendations for the prevention of LASA are quite extensive; still, in a system with a lump
sum payment per case not all of these security measures may be feasible. This issue remains to be approached on an
individual basis, taking into consideration local set ups as well as financial issues.
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In a health care system based on lump sum payment
(Diagnosis-Related Group, DRG), competing suppliers of
health care are forced to optimize cost efficiency to gen-
erate revenue. Simultaneously, patient safety has become
an overall goal for all parties involved, and can limit cost
efficiency and hence revenue substantially.
Patient safety is at risk due to medication errors, and
roughly 30% are due to similar packaging and labeling,
as well as illegible handwriting. The term LASA (“look-
alike sound-alike”) delineates a confusion of medication
due to the similar labeling and packaging of different
drugs, or similar labeling and packaging of the same
drug containing different strengths.
These errors occur along the line of prescribing, pre-
paring, distributing and administering medication. Vari-
ous factors contribute to the LASA incident, and
accounts for 7-20% of all medication errors [1-5]:* Correspondence: Joerg.Schnoor@medizin.uni-leipzig.de
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– oral and vague prescription (“half an ampule”)
– incomplete knowledge of name of medication and
substance
– newly released drugs in ever shorter periods of time
– similar packaging and labeling
– dismissing barcode technology at point of care
– similar clinical use of drugs
– similar dosage and concentration
– diverging concentration on similarly looking
packaging
– displaying concentration in percent instead of
numerical units
– dismissing the use of capital letters (ie.
PENTObarbital versus PHENObarbital)
– confusing and/or no separate stocking of high risk
medication
A typical case of LASA has been published recently [6].
To demonstrate the reciprocity of patient safety and
cost efficiency, this true report of medication errors
highlighted by the use of a Critical Incident Reportingl. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
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eric brand are calculated and measures to avoid medica-
tion errors are demonstrated, as published by most
recent guidelines.
Case presentation
Upon restocking opioids, changing from Dipidolor™
(a trade name of Piritramid from the Janssen-Cilag
GmbH, Germany) to the generic brand Piritramid (Hameln
pharma, Germany), with Dipidolor being a commonly used
opioid for post-operative pain in Germany, opioids were or-
dered as a 1 ml vial containing 7.5 mg/ml of Piritramid, in-
stead of the usually ordered and used 2 ml vials containing
15 mg/2 ml of Piritramid, still from the same manufacturer
(see the figure of medication boxes (Figure 1)). However,
these stocks were falsely registered as 2 ml vials in the drug
cupboard logbook on the ward. In some cases, prescrip-
tions were made as “… administer half a vial of Piritra-
mid…” by physicians. A CIRS was filed anonymously,
however, at this point no conclusion could be drawn as
how many patients had been involved and which patient
had received what dosage. Assumingly “half an vial” of Piri-
tramid has led to some patients receiving 3.75 mg of Piri-
tramid instead of 7.5 mg.
As a learning system, the in-house CIRS is operating
since 2010 on an electronic basis, voluntarily and an-
onymously. All cases are electronically published and ar-
chived. Two days after this case had been reported, both
a review on anonymity and a request for proposals to
the departments that may be involved were conducted.
Two weeks later, the incoming suggestions on practical-
ity were reviewed and, if possible, implemented.
What recommendations have been published?
Apart from the regular requirements for staff, like holding
a recognized degree in medicine or nursing, maximum at-
tention to be paid when making difficult decisions on orFigure 1 Medication boxes of Piritramid-hameln (Hameln, Germany) w
(7,5 mg Piritramid), respectively.distribution of any medication, or a sufficient number of
staff to shoulder the workload, there are numerous recom-
mendations [1]:
– interdisciplinary cooperation (pharmacist,
physicians, auxiliary staff, commission on
medication) regarding stocks of medication available
– non-standardized medication should be prepared by
in-house pharmacy. Whenever feasible, ready to
use/ ready to administer drugs should be given
– replacing similar sounding drugs by drugs with
different brand name containing same substance
maintain awareness for LASA issue. Keeping lists of
such drugs, which can enhance awareness for the
potential of medication error. Regular updates from
the in-house CIRS should be mandatory
– if LASA prone medication is in use, these drugs
should be highlighted by pharmacy or relabeled
altogether (signal effect for potential danger of
medication error)
– barcode scanning technology to be implemented at
point of care
– all members of staff involved in medicating patients
should receive recurring training for awareness of
LASA
– stringent feedback of LASA issues to FDA and
pharmaceutical industry via pharmacists from
hospitals
A proven concept is the double verification principle or
two-man rule. In Addition, there are various recommenda-
tions on logistics to reduce medication errors as well [7]:
– considering LASA when ordering stocks. Whenever
feasible, preferring alternative suppliers
– ideally, only one strength/concentration of each
substance should be available on wards. Divergingith 2×5 vials ad 2 ml-vials (15 mg Piritramid) and 1 ml-vials
Table 1 Drug costs observed (List price 2012 in EURO; 1
Euro ~ 1,38 USD [10])
Drugs
(number of vials per
package and costs)
costs
2010
costs
2011
costs
2012
Dipidolor™ 15 mg/2 ml n = 42.400 n = 17.500 n = 0
(5 vials 17,17€) 145.601,60 € 60.095,00 €
Piritramid 15 mg/2 ml n = 0 n = 18.300 n = 26.400
(10 vials 21,97€) 40.205,10 € 58000,80 €
Piritramid 7,5 mg/1 ml n = 0 n = 4.500 n = 8.000
(10 vials 18,40€) 8280,00 € 14.720,00 €
Total costs (EURO) 145.601,60 108.580,10 72.720,80
Total costs (USD) 200.930,21 149.840,54 100.354,70
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individual cases only
– if, however, LASA medication needs to be stocked,
these should carry warning labels, especially high
risk medication with a narrow therapeutical margin,
for example cardiovascular drugs, anesthetic drugs,
cytostatins, high risk electrolyte carrying fluids, and
the likes. Separate stocking of such drugs
– a change to a barcode driven medication process
can reduce the risk of confusing drugs significantly
[7,8]
Previous changes in medication
Prior to this incident, a change was proposed from staff
regarding usage of Piritramid 2 ml vials, as
- half of the substance (15 mg vials of 2 ml of Piritramid)
was mostly discarded.
- cost efficiency could be achieved by switching to a
generic product.
Impact of change to a generic substance
The change to the generic Piritramid was implemented on
June 6th 2011. A pharmacy audit of 2010–2012 showed a
reduction in prescribed Piritramid distribution (see the fig-
ure of pharmacy dispensing of Dipidolor™- and Piritra-
mid-vials (Figure 2)). However, a multi-nodal pain bundle
was implemented around that time as well, including an
increase in regional anesthesia techniques intra-operatively,
and could contribute to this downturn in post-operative
opioid consumption of Piritramid considerably. Addition-
ally, incomplete knowledge of newly introduced drugs and
dosages could be adding to this phenomenon.
Whether long-term effects based on an ageing popula-
tion with a decreased need for opioids, or shorter overall
stays in our hospital were attributing to this remains de-
batable, as pharmacy audit of 2012 showed a balanced
consumption (see the figure of pharmacy dispensing of
Piritramid-packs per month in 2012 (Figure 3)) again.
Costs
A change in brands of stocked medication creates costs.
Analysis of this process conducted by a University dem-
onstrated costs of US$ 2.400 for a simple change to a
generic substance.
A change to a generic substance with a different brand
name amounted to US$ 5.200 on average. Introducing a
different substance and name to replace a brand came
with a price tag of around US$ 6.480 [9]. These costs are
of course examples, whether these can be assigned to
other changeovers remains to be seen.
Table 1 demonstrates a gross cost ratio of our given
case (German prices). The observed pool of costs relat-
ing to Piritramid showed a reduction of 50% over the
course of a three years’ time. During these three years ofobservation we found a decline in distribution of Piritra-
mid of 19%. The change to a generic brand alone gener-
ated a cost reduction of 16% per year. This reduction in
costs needs to be put in contrast to errors occurring in
medicating patients with Piritramid 7.5 mg vials and Pir-
itramid 15 mg vials.In-house recommendations
As a rule, solutions must be tailored to local require-
ments while at the same time being financially reason-
able. In the given case the 15 mg vials were taken out
of stock completely. Alternatively, a different brand
with a different label and packaging could have been
chosen. If, however, different dosages are required,
these could be spread over different wards/units alter-
natively, and staff awareness should be ensured, either
computer based or by bulletins.Discussion
About 1/3 of all cases of confusing medication correlate
with similar packaging and labeling of drugs, at the same
time 50% of all cases of confusing medication is due to
poor performance of qualified staff. Underlying reasons
discussed are overly burdened staff and psychological as-
pects like confirmation bias [2,11-14]. Other problems
like translational problems and mistakable labeling er-
rors, which led to errors in the use of implants, were de-
scribed and discussed in the recent literature [15].
A DRG based health care system payment coerces em-
ployees to exert more work in the same given time. This
“rat race” leads to more pressure at the bedside, which
might favor an increase in errors in medication. An ana-
lysis of 235 CIRS case reports within the Department of
Anesthesiology showed that an overload of work is the
second highest factor contributing to confusing medica-
tions as per LASA definition [16].
Figure 2 Pharmacy dispensing of Dipidolor™- and Piritramid-vials in 2010–2012.
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avoidance of medication errors/LASA. A financial com-
pensation for this is not implemented in the German
health care system as per DRG lump sum payment
method, despite the fact that both politics as well as insur-
ance companies should feel obliged to do so. Furthermore,
pharmaceutical companies could contribute considerably
to patient safety by abandoning a corporate design, redu-
cing confusion of medication consecutively.Conclusion
Patient safety and cost efficiency do not necessarily have
to exclude each other. Still targeting cost efficiency can
easily endanger patient safety. Somehow both aspects can
be seen as antipodes, where leveling can only be achievedFigure 3 Pharmacy dispensing of Piritramid-packs with 10 vials (7,5 mfor single cases, just before legal implications come into
play.
Every hospital’s staff cannot handle the LASA issue indi-
vidually, but politics as well as pharmaceutical companies
can contribute significantly to patient safety regarding
medication errors, especially by abandoning corporate de-
sign and allowing for a higher variety in packaging and de-
sign. Beside the LASA issue, understaffing contributes to
confusion of medication and needs to be addressed locally,
though determining the right amount of staff versus just
not enough seems to be a thin line.
However, adding LASA to this gray area of understaffing
and overload of work is an accident waiting to happen.
Pressure on implementation of already existing measures to
counter LASA experiences a new surge from indemnity in-
surers, forcing hospitals to invest in their staff and makingg in 1 ml; 15 mg in 2 ml) per month in 2012.
Schnoor et al. Patient Safety in Surgery  (2015) 9:12 Page 5 of 5sure that an ever-increasing workload is not detrimental to
patient safety, finally leading to health care providers invest-
ing in patient safety.
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